"It seems manifest that thus far the difference between the present comparatively mild business recession and the severe depression of [1920] [1921] is like that between a thundershower and a tornado" (May 5, 1930) "Business showed further gain last week and if improvement continues at the present rate, September should mark the low of the depression." (October 17, 1931) ---Irving Fisher
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While some sages claimed to have forecast the collapse of the stock market in 1929, no guru divined the ensuing depression. At the outset, the Great Depression appeared to be an ordinary, though sharp, recession (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) . Most economic indicators had declined almost continuously from August 1929 until the end of 1930. Although consumers and investors seem to have become unusually uncertain after the 1929 stock market crash (Romer, 1990) , many businessmen seemed to believe that it would be only a short contraction. In retrospect, this bullishness amazes, as the only relief from decline was an increase in industrial production and personal income in the first quarter of 1931.
Mirroring this positive outlook of some business leaders, Irving Fisher of Yale and the forecasters at the Harvard Economic Service remained extraordinarily optimistic two years into the greatest economic recession of the twentieth century.
2 While the extant evidence shows that professional forecasters failed to predict that the recession would turn into a depression, there is no clear consensus about whether business or the public, in general anticipated it. Much attention has focused on whether the price deflation was predicted. If deflation were anticipated, the falling nominal yields would have coincided with rising real yields, thus helping to explain the collapsing consumption and investment that is emphasized in many explanations of the Great Depression (Brunner, 1981; Cecchetti, 1992; Romer, 1992 Romer, , 1993 . If, on the other hand, the decline in prices was unanticipated, it would have hit the economy by adding to debt burdens, forcing otherwise solvent debtors into bankruptcy and raising risk premiums (Fisher, 1933 , Bernanke, 1983 , Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 , Calomiris, 1993 .
Evidence for correctly anticipating the deflation was provided by Cecchetti's (1992) forecasts of prices. He pointed out that changes in the price level were positively correlated in the interwar period, implying that simple rules of thumb would have led to expectations of a continued deflation. Reading the business press, Nelson (1991) concluded that up until mid-1930 most observers expected only a mild deflation. Afterwards, they anticipated a much greater deflation, which might move prices back to pre-World War I levels. Romer (1992) found that high ex ante real rates of interest through 1932 were responsible for the collapse of fixed investment and consumer durable spending. 3 In contrast, Hamilton (1987) argued that the information content of futures markets for commodities showed that the great deflation was largely unanticipated. Modelling the relationship between commodity prices and the aggregate price level, Hamilton (1992) found that for the first year of the depression people only expected one tenth of the total price level decline, while in 1931 and 1932 half the price drops were anticipated. Supporting the view that changes in the price level were unanticipated, Evans and Wachtel (1993) claimed that they were largely unexpected because there was considerable ex ante uncertainty about the future course of prices. forecast the depression, expecting it to follow the pattern of recent recessions. Unexpected policy and economic events fooled both the public and the experts.
Surveying Railroad Shippers
Surveys of expectations are relatively rare in economics, historical surveys are even rarer.
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In this paper we have "rediscovered" the only known survey data concerning macroeconomic events from the Great Depression. Although studied as late as the 1950s and early 1960s, railroad shippers' forecasts were forgotten just as the econometric revolution began.
Coordinating freight cars to move goods across the United States undamaged and on time had always been difficult. In the 1920s, the problem of freight car allocation alarmed 3 Romer estimated expected real rates of interest, with the embedded expected inflation rates, from the fitted values of a regression of the ex post real commercial paper rates on current and lagged macroeconomic variables plus seasonals. 4 Lovell (1986) reviewed the few surveys of business forecasts and their implications for theories of expectations.
many shippers who found that they were unable to secure cars in sufficient number in time to keep their shipments on schedule. In response, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) asked shippers to estimate their freight car requirements one quarter in advance. Beginning in 1923, regional Shippers' Advisory Boards were formed under the auspices of the Car Service Division of the AAR (Hultgren, 1955) .
The AAR's railroad shippers' forecasts of the demand for freight cars for 32 commodities from 13 regions were produced by Regional Shippers Advisory Boards. These regional boards collected data from business firms' traffic managers. The traffic manager was responsible for arranging and expediting the shipment of a firm's product to purchasers and the receipt of supplies and equipment. With knowledge of the firm's production and shipment schedules, the traffic manager made arrangements with railroads and other carriers.
Approximately six weeks before the beginning of the next quarter, the shippers were asked to forecast their freight car requirements for that quarter. The forecasts were compiled two to three weeks later by the regional board and then submitted to the national board and the AAR.
The final figures were published just before the beginning of the quarter in a release, the "National Forecast of the Regional Shippers Advisory Boards." One quarter later, these releases reported the actual freight car use, thus providing an easy measure of the error made by these business managers in their forecast of the shipment of goods. According to Ferber (1953) , the AAR apparently found these forecasts useful and established nationwide forecasts in 1927. These forecasts represent business firms' estimates of the goods they planned to ship and are thus a proxy for the demand for their goods. 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Millions
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The forecast errors made by the shippers, shown in Figure 2 , are measured as the difference between the actual and forecast carloadings as a fraction of actual carloadings.
This graph tells a striking story about business expectations. Although the errors ranged from 3 to 10 percent in the three years before the Great Depression, this broad sample of businessmen made consistently larger errors after the crash of the stock market in October 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
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The survey errors also appear to show the surprise of the New Deal. According to Temin and Wigmore (1990) 
Survey Data and the Business Cycle
Might these errors be the results of problems with the survey? Although this is a possibility, this survey data is largely immune from the criticism of some types of survey data.
Contemporary macroeconomic surveys, like the Livingstone survey, ask professional economists and analysts for their forecasts. Keane and Runkle (1990) argue that these surveys are reliable guides to expectations because the individuals surveyed depend on their reputation as forecasters for their livelihood. On the other hand, others argue that forecasters answers are affected by strategic motives for introducing systematic bias into publicly available forecasts (Ehrbeck and Waldmann, 1986) . While not completely safe from these criticisms, traffic managers' livelihoods did depend on producing accurate reports. There may have been some strategic behavior; but in most industries, each firm was sufficiently small that it could not hope to influence the outcome. Furthermore, one contemporary expert (Hultgren, 1948) saw no change in the movement of empty cars from 1920 onwards that might have been an indication of strategic behavior after the introduction of the survey. Another possible source of bias would be shippers loss functions; if these were asymmetric, it could create the appearance of bias.
The data collected in this survey are not the longest nor the most comprehensive time series. As surveying was costly, the AAR included only the "more important kinds of carload traffic" (Hultgren, 1955, p. 363 Carloadings have some limitations as measures of economic activity and freight-ton miles would be a better indication of the services rendered by the railroads. However, carloadings are a good proxy for general economic activity even though agricultural commodities bulked larger in carloadings than in an index of industrial production. Table 1 shows the actual and estimated carloadings by commodity for the first quarter of 1930. 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Millions AAR Carloadings Shippers' Carloadings 1 9 2 7 1 9 2 8 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 1 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 3 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 5 1 9 3 6 1 9 3 7 1 9 3 8 1 9 3 9 1 9 4 0
FRB Industrial Production Weighted Carloadings
The reason for this shift in the level of carloadings is the loss of traffic to trucks and pipelines. In 1930, railroads hauled 74.3 percent of the 524 billion freight ton-miles, with trucks accounting for 3.9 and pipelines 5.3 percent. By 1940, total freight-ton miles reached 618 billion freight-ton miles, but railroads had only 61.3 percent, while trucks and pipelines picked up 10.0 and 9.6 percent respectively (Stover, 1961 Commerce Commission the power to establish maximum and minimum rates among other broad powers of regulation. When railroad revenues fell in the early 1930s, the industry appealed for a 15 percent increase in freight rates in 1931. This plea was not answered and rates were slightly increased an average of 2.6 percent. Yet, raising prices while other prices tumbled is astonishing. In contrast, trucking was a highly competitive industry. Truck transport, unlike rail transport was easy to enter, with the government providing the highways.
Trucks could be bought second hand and wages were determined by the market not the railroad union or federal legislation. The loss of business to trucking helped to secure the passage of the Motor Carrier Act in 1935, which regulated truck rates, but it had relatively little effect in the period under consideration (Hultgren, 1948; O'Brien, 1989) .
Better Forecasts?
The survey of shippers covered hundreds of firms and should have given a reasonable measurement of business expectations. The large and repeated errors of the early 1930s are quite surprising and raise the question whether business could have done a better job of forecasting the depression. These forecasts of transportation services, which seem to proxy industrial production, fail in a fashion analogous to the forecasts of future prices of commodities found by Hamilton (1987) . Cecchetti (1992) raised the question of whether deflation and ex ante real rates of interest could have been predicted with accuracy, estimating ARMA models of inflation and examining the properties of the forecasts from these models.
In this section, we examine whether a simple ARMA model or rule of thumb using carloading data could have outperformed the railroad shippers.
A key problem is that the actual data on shippers' carloadings corresponding to the That is, the percentage change in the AAR Carloadings series from period t to period t-1 was used to extend the ActualShipCL series back to the start of the sample. 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Millions
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Could a time series econometrician have forecasted the downturn of the early 1930s better than the shippers in the survey? To answer this question, we used an ARIMA time series forecasting model, using the Box-Jenkins modeling philosophy. To select the appropriate ARIMA model, we needed to identify any non-stationary components in the data.
Given the strong seasonal nature of the data, the seasonal unit test of Hylleberg et. al. (1990) was used.; the results are reported in Table 2 . There was evidence of a unit root in the data at the long run frequency and the quarterly frequency but not at the half-yearly frequency. Hence the data needed to be 1 st differenced and 4 th differenced to make it stationary. This data on carloadings thus shares characteristics of many macroeconomic time series. 
The model that minimizes both the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) was the ARIMA(3,1,3)(0,1,1) 4 model. This model was estimated using data for the period 1918:1 until 1927:2 and 1-step ahead out of sample forecasts were produced using this model. Obviously, the men in the back offices of the railroads in the 1930s would not have had today's best practice time series forecasting technology. However, they were familiar with patterns of seasonality and plotted trends. As a possible approximation to some simple rules they might have used, we tried the Holt-Winters 9 exponential smoothing forecasting model, which allows for a changing level, trend and seasonality: 7 Critical values for sample size 100 with an included constant in the regression equation. Source: Patterson(2000) 8 Note that p and q refer to the AR and MA order while P and Q refer to the Seasonal AR and MA orders. 9 For a reference to this forecasting method see Granger and Newbold (1977) , Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991) , Makridakis, Wheelright, and Hyndman (1998) . This method is very much in the spirit of Ferber's study (1953) of railroad shippers forecasts. Lovell (1964) also compared a simple model of regressive expectations with the survey forecasts for the period 1947-1956. 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Percent 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Percent
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The forecast diagnostics for all three forecasting efforts are shown in Table 3 , which contains the root mean squared forecast error (RMSE), Theil's U statistic, and a decomposition of the RMSE into its bias, variance and covariance components. The bias component represents the proportion of the RMSE that is attributable to bias in the forecast, while the variance component represents the proportion of the RMSE that can be explained by getting the variance of the forecast wrong. The covariance component represents the unexplained portion of the RMSE. Table 3 provide disturbing evidence on the accuracy of contemporary business forecasts. As Theil's U for all forecasts is considerably less than one, all methods forecast carloadings better than a naïve forecast using the previous observation.
However, as is evident in the size of the RMSE, business' performance was notably worse. 
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The Composition of the Forecasts
The railroad shippers's reports provide detailed forecasts for twenty-nine goods.
Tables 4 and 5 provide forecast diagnostics for the survey forecasts and the forecast using the Holt-Winters procedure. As we were unable to extend the series back before 1928, we did not attempt to use an ARIMA model to produce out-of-sample forecasts, as the depression was immediately on the horizon. However, as the results above demonstrate, the Holt-Winters forecasts are not inferior to our ARIMA model for the aggregate carloadings. Table 4 , what is striking are the commodities where the proportion of error from bias is high, indicating that these were the ones primarily responsible for the poor aggregate forecast. The commodities with high bias (greater than 10 percent) were intermediate or capital goods for industry and construction: coal, coke, clay, gravel, sand, stone, lumber, petroleum, iron, steel, machinery, cement, bricks, lime, plaster, automobiles, and trucks. In contrast, the forecast of the demand for railroad cars for agricultural goods display much less bias. This difference disappears in the measure of bias in the estimates by the Holt-Winters procedure in Table 5 . By this method, there is no visible difference between the errors made in forecasting carloadings for industrial goods and agricultural goods.
Prices for agricultural goods plunged during the depression, but consumption of foodstuffs and agricultural products was stable by comparison. The greatest challenge for the traffic managers was to predict whether there would be a bumper crop or crop failure, and hence there were some large random errors. However, there were no long streaks of large and growing errors in the forecasting for agricultural commodities. What the traffic managers did not expect was the decline in industrial products and construction materials. Demand for these products collapsed as the economy slid into the depression. Their prices certainly declined but not enough to avoid a decline in inventories and production.
Deflation and Demand Surprises
This study of expectations of the Great Depression offers new insight into the debate over whether the economic decline was anticipated. Although Hamilton (1987 Hamilton ( , 1992 and Cecchetti (1992) argue over whether the price decline was anticipated; this examination of railroad shippers forecasts helps to reconcile them. Like the investors and speculators in the commodities futures markets or the forecasters at Harvard and Yale, the traffic managers at the railroads continued to make large errors, anticipating a recovery. They could not believe the steady decline in output (like others who could not believe the decline in prices), although simple rules or a modern ARIMA model would have advised them to pay attention to the most recent events. They could not believe that a depression of this length and depth could happen; the economy surely had reached bottom and had to rebound.
The recessions in recent experience had been brief. The peak to trough was 18, 14
and 13 months for the recessions of January 1920-July 1921 (of great severity), May 1923 -July 1924 , and October 1926 -November 1927 As seen in Figures 6 and 7 , the survey forecasts track the 1929-1930 recession no worse than the two models into its fifth or sixth quarter. But, by the time the recession entered its second year, the large errors began to cumulate, suggesting that the railroads believed that a turnaround had to be imminent.
In Table 6 , the percentage forecast errors made by railroad shippers are compared to the models and the forecasts provided by Cecchetti (1992) and Hamilton (1992) . To construct a railroad shippers' forecast error similar to an inflation error, it is measured as the difference between the projected percentage increase in carloadings from the actual carloadings in the previous quarter less the actual percentage increase in carloadings. The forecast errors reported for Cecchetti's study are the differences between actual inflation, measured by the consumer price index, and expected inflation from a MA(2) model, an AR(1) model and an interest-rate model, while Hamilton's error is the difference between actual inflation and forecasts of inflation using commodity prices by trimester. 
1929.1
The source of the surprises was the large and continued negative shocks to the economy, against which policy makers took little action. The stock market crash of 1929 was contained and did not spread to the rest of the financial system because of the reaction of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, but the decline in asset values reduced wealth. As Romer (1990) showed, households responded by reducing their consumption of semi-durables and dramatically their consumption of durables---products that required the intermediate goods shipped by the railroads. The banking panics and gold outflows reduced the money supply and the willingness and ability of banks to lend (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Bernanke, 1983; Eichengreen, 1992) .
Business seems to have had considerable faith that either the business cycle would quickly turn or the Federal Reserve would take corrective action as it appeared to have done in the earlier recessions of the 1920s. As we know, the Fed certainly disappointed them. It kept to a strict adherence to the policies that had been developed in the 1920s, using borrowed reserves and nominal market interest rates as policy instruments (Wicker, 1966; Brunner and Meltzer; 1968 , Wheelock, 1991 Calomiris and Wheelock, 1998) . When member banks borrowed little from the Fed and market rates were particularly low, policy was interpreted by the Fed as easy. The banking crises that made banks reluctant to borrow and the deflation that made real rates high rendered these instruments useless, ensuring the Fed would not respond.
While the Federal Reserve did not change its policy, business could not believe that the Fed would not react to the economic decline, leading business to incorrectly forecast the depth and duration of the depression. For the railways themselves, managers' animal spirits remained high, but at a cost, keeping inventories and their prices too high. The public and business were able to anticipate some of the deflation, with the consequence that real ex ante interest rates were extremely high. Yet, the collapse of demand and deflation were certainly not fully anticipated and thus business was left with excessive inventories and increasingly expensive debt burdens.
